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ABSTRACT 9 
Objective: Drivers’ risk tendency is a key issue of on-road safety. The purpose of the 10 
present study was to explore individual differences in drivers’ decision-making 11 
processes, linking external behaviors to internal neural activity, to reveal the cognitive 12 
mechanisms of on-road risky behaviors. 13 
Methods: Twenty-four male drivers were split into two groups (risky versus safe 14 
drivers) by their self-reported risky driving, measured by the Driving Behavior 15 
Questionnaire (DBQ). To assess the drivers’ behavioral and neural patterns of 16 
decision-making, two psychological paradigms were adopted: the Iowa Gambling 17 
Task (IGT) and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). The performance of each 18 
task and corresponding Event Related Potentials (ERPs) evoked by feedback were 19 
recorded. 20 
Results: In IGT, both driver groups demonstrated similar capacities to realize the 21 
advantage choices (decks with larger expected rewards) through long-term 22 
selection-feedback process. However, the risky drivers showed higher preference for 23 
the risky choices (decks with identical expected rewards but larger variances) than the 24 
safe drivers. In BART, the risky drivers demonstrated higher adjusted pumps than that 25 
of the safe drivers, especially for the trials following previous negative feedback. 26 
More importantly, the risky drivers showed lower amplitudes of Feedback-Related 27 
Negativity (FRN) after negative feedbacks, as well as the lower amplitudes of 28 
loss-minus-gain FRN, in both paradigms. The significant between-group difference of 29 
P300 amplitudes was also reported, which was modified by specific paradigms and 30 
according feedbacks. 31 
Conclusion: The drivers’ on-road behaviors were determined by the cognitive process, 32 
indicated by the behavioral and neural patterns of decision-making. The risky drivers 33 
were relatively less error-revised and more reward-motivated, which were associated 34 
with the according neural processing of error-detection and reward-evaluation. In this 35 
light, it is feasible to quantize divers’ risk tendency in the cognitive stage before 36 





Traffic accidents and drivers’ risk tendency 40 
According to the World Health Organization report (WHO, 2013), the total number of 41 
road traffic deaths is unacceptable high at 1.24 million per year, which equates to 42 
nearly 3,400 fatalities on the world’s roads every day, with many more being seriously 43 
injured. Various countermeasures have been adopted to prevent these on-road 44 
tragedies, such as crash-protective vehicle designs, advanced traffic systems, law 45 
enforcement, etc. However, drivers’ risk tendency and accordingly unsafe behaviors 46 
has long been a bottleneck for the improvement of on-road safety (Arthur, Barret, & 47 
Alexander, 1991; Gully, Whitney, & Vanosdall, 1995). 48 
On-road risk-taking reflects drivers’ inherent motivation rather than their limited 49 
capacities in regard to visual-cognition-motor skills. Previous studies of unsafe 50 
driving have suggested that violations and errors are two distinct behavior-types 51 
(Blockey & Hartley, 1995; Reason, Manstead, Stradling, Baxter, & Campbell, 1990). 52 
Violations are defined as “deliberate deviations from those practices believed 53 
necessary to maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous system”, while 54 
errors are referred to as “the failure of planned actions to achieve their intended 55 
consequences” (Reason et al., 1990). Based on this definition, the Driver Behavior 56 
Questionnaire (DBQ) was developed as a survey instrument to measure these 57 
concepts of driving behaviors and has since been validated across a wide-range of 58 
countries and populations (e.g. Lajunen, Parker, & Summala, 2004; Parker, McDonald, 59 
Rabbitt, & Sutcliffe, 2000; Parker, Reason, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995; Xie & 60 
Parker, 2002). 61 
Within the scope of driving safety, a considerable number of studies have attempted to 62 
propose and validate different models and theories to explain the individual 63 
differences of risky driving (Arthur et al., 1991; Conner et al., 2007; Gully et al., 1995; 64 
Ivers et al., 2009; Iversen & Rundmo, 2002; Jonah, 1986; Parker, Manstead, Stradling, 65 
& Reason, 1992; Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003). In these researches, various variables 66 
were validated as predictors of drivers’ risk tendency, such as certain demographics, 67 
attitudes, personality traits and risk perception (Arthur et al., 1991; Conner et al., 2007; 68 
Parker et al., 1992). For instance, young drivers are at greater risk of being involved 69 
in accidents than older drivers as a function of their propensity to take risks (Jonah, 70 
1986); while male drivers demonstrate higher aggression and thrill seeking than 71 
female drivers (Turner & McClure, 2003). According to the Theory of Planned 72 
Behavior (Ajzen, 2002), subjective attitudes towards traffic safety are related to the 73 
violation, aggression and fast driving (Conner et al., 2007; Elliott, Armitage, & 74 
Baughan, 2007; Parker et al., 1992; Poulter, Chapman, Bibby, Clarke, & Crundall, 75 
2008). Moreover, drivers’ personality traits, e.g. sensation-seeking or normlessness, 76 
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are also considerable contributors to their risk tendency (Iversen & Rundmo, 2002; 77 
Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003). These risky drivers are also likely to show higher 78 
acceptance/lower perceived risks to the hazards in the traffic environment, as 79 
compared to safe drivers (Ivers et al., 2009; Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003). Despite these 80 
findings of individual differences on risky driving, the neural basis of drivers’ risky 81 
decision-making are largely unknown and need to be further explored. 82 
Neural basis of decision-making 83 
As to the decision-making in general situation, a basic function of human brain is 84 
identifying and choosing between alternatives based on the perceived utility for 85 
providing a positive outcome (gain or certainty) or avoiding a negative outcome (loss 86 
or uncertainty) (Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & 87 
Poldrack, 2007). The empirical studies with the measurements of Event-Related 88 
Potential (ERP) and Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have proved 89 
that front limbic brain circuits are activated during this process (Kennerley, Walton, 90 
Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006; van Veen & Carter, 2002). Especially, 91 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), located on the medial surface of the frontal lobes, 92 
is important for the rational cognition with the function of risk-aversion (Carlson, 93 
Zayas, & Guthormsen, 2009; Tom et al., 2007; van Veen & Carter, 2002). 94 
When ACC processes feedback from decision-making, two ERP components, 95 
Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) and P300, demonstrate sensitivity (Carlson et al., 96 
2009; Frank, Woroch, & Curran, 2005; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Lange, Leue, & 97 
Beauducel, 2012; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). The FRN (approximately 200-300 ms after 98 
feedback) is a negative deflection pattern related to an error-detection signal which 99 
reflects the violation of reward expectations (Bellebaum, Polezzi, & Daum, 2010). 100 
The monitoring system uses this signal to reinforce the learning process, and revise 101 
future decision-making (Frank et al., 2005). Thus, more negative FRN amplitude 102 
occurs in response to negative rather than positive feedback (Bellebaum et al., 2010; 103 
Carlson et al., 2009; Lange et al., 2012). The P300 (approximately 300-400 ms after 104 
feedback) is a positive peak pattern related to the reward-evaluation process 105 
(Nieuwenhuis, Gilzenrat, Holmes, & Cohen, 2005; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). The P300 106 
amplitude varies with the motivational significance of feedback information and 107 
increases for those individuals who attribute more meaning to that feedback (Carlson 108 
et al., 2009). 109 
The evidences from neural studies suggested that the feedback-locked ERP is 110 
responsive to individual differences. For example, the people with greater family 111 
history of alcohol problems demonstrated smaller amplitudes of FRN after negative 112 
feedback (Fein & Chang, 2008). Consistent results of larger amplitude of FRN were 113 
also found for the high-risk adolescents when an expected reward did not occur 114 
 4 
 
(Crowley et al., 2009). A reasonable explanation for these findings is that these people 115 
who have a propensity to engage in high risk activities are less sensitive to negative 116 
feedback. Additionally, a recent study (San Martin, Appelbaum, Pearson, Huettel, & 117 
Woldorff, 2013) found that the amplitude of P300 indicated the individuals' 118 
behavioral tendencies to maximize gains or to minimize losses. Based on the above 119 
results, one may assume that individuals’ behavioral differences of risk-taking are 120 
rooted in neural processes of decision-making, which can be accordingly identified 121 
through ERPs.  122 
Paradigms to identify risky decision-making 123 
To provide laboratory measurements of decision-making, the Iowa Gambling Task 124 
(IGT) and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) are widely used as psychological 125 
paradigms that reflect characteristics of risky decision-making. 126 
The IGT (Antoine Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) is a 127 
risk-anticipation task which aims to assess the learning process and anticipate 128 
long-term risks in decision-making. During the experiment, participants are required 129 
to draw a card from one of four decks (typically displayed on a computer screen). 130 
Each card either awards money to the participant, or deducts money from current 131 
winnings. Two of the decks (i.e. disadvantage decks) inevitably lead to a long-term 132 
loss if one sticks to that deck, even though individual cards might seem to offer high 133 
rewards. The other two decks (i.e. advantage decks) result in a net gain if one sticks 134 
with that deck, even though individual cards might not seem that profitable. 135 
Participants can choose freely from any decks and alternate among the decks, with the 136 
explicit goal being to win as much money as possible (which contains the implicit 137 
goal of identifying decks with higher long-term rewards). Clinical studies have 138 
demonstrated that people with prefrontal cortex impairment will fail to anticipate 139 
future outcomes from historical feedback during IGT and continue to pick from the 140 
disadvantage decks (Antoine Bechara et al., 1994; A. Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & 141 
Damasio, 1997). 142 
The BART (Lejuez et al., 2002) is another validated paradigm to evaluate risk-taking 143 
tendency in the real word. A small balloon accompanied with a pump-button and a 144 
collection-button was presented to participants. Within each trial, clicks on the 145 
pump-button inﬂate the balloon incrementally, though the balloon could randomly 146 
explode after any pump. When the participant clicks the collection-button, he/she will 147 
gain a reward proportional to the size of balloon. If the balloon explodes however, the 148 
participant gains nothing. The breakpoint of the balloon was randomly determined for 149 
each trial. The studies of BART suggested that the average number of pumps on 150 
successful trials (i.e. where the participant collects the reward before the balloon 151 
explodes) were sensitive to impulsive sensation seeking and risk-taking in the real 152 
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world (Lauriola, Panno, Levin, & Lejuez, 2014; Lejuez et al., 2003). 153 
Hypotheses and approaches 154 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the differences between the risky and 155 
safe drivers on the behavioral and neural patterns of decision-making. Two 156 
hypotheses were proposed: 1) laboratory behavioral measures of drivers’ 157 
decision-making are correlated with their on-road behaviors, and self-reported risky 158 
drivers make more risks on the two laboratory tasks; 2) the ERP excited by feedback, 159 
in terms of FRN and P300, should also differ between risky and safe drivers, which 160 
could reflect the neural basis of decision-making and therefore influence driving 161 
behaviors. The recruited drivers were classified based on their on-road behaviors rated 162 
by the violations aspect of DBQ. IGT and BART were used as the tasks to measure 163 
drivers’ behavioral patterns of decision-making. While engaging in each task, the 164 
feedback-related ERP was recorded to measure the drivers’ neural patterns. 165 
METHODS 166 
Participants 167 
Twenty-four male drivers (age from 22 to 28) were recruited from a university 168 
population through an online bulletin board. All participants were required to have a 169 
minimum of three years’ active driving experience (more than one driving per week) 170 
with a valid license and more than 15,000 kilometers’ total driving distance. 171 
Participants were also required to meet additional criteria: right-handed, no history of 172 
traumatic brain injury or neurological diseases. Each participant received instructions 173 
about the aims and procedures of the experiments, signed the informed consent, and 174 
received basic compensation of RMB 120 Yuan (approximately 20 U.S. dollars) and 175 
additional payment based on the total rewards obtained on IGT and BART. 176 
Experimental task and measurements 177 
IGT and behavioral measurements 178 
IGT in present study was modified based on the original version (Antoine Bechara et 179 
al., 1994), adapted for ERPs analysis. This modified IGT consisted of four blocks (50 180 
trials in each block, 200 trials in total) to obtain enough evoked ERPs. The 181 
participants were instructed to maximize the total rewards through selections from 182 
four card decks and they could choose freely from any decks and alternate among the 183 
decks for each trial. 184 
The detailed trial sequence of IGT is illustrated in Figure 1. The four decks involved 185 
four choices of different characteristics: A- disadvantage and low-risk (50% chance to 186 
gain 10 score, 50% chance to lose 15 score), B- disadvantage and high-risk (90% 187 
change to gain 10 score, 10% chance to lose 115 score), C- advantage and low-risk 188 
(50% chance to gain 5 score, 50% chance to gain 0 score), D- advantage and high-risk 189 
(90% chance to gain 5 score, 10% chance to lose 20 score). The disadvantage decks 190 
 6 
 
would result in overall losses for participants sticking with them over the long term 191 
(expected reward equal to -2.5 score for each trial), while the advantage decks 192 
produced a positive gain over the long term (expected reward equal to -2.5 score for 193 
each trial). The low-risk decks were of smaller variances (frequent but small losses) 194 
for the long-term selections, while the high-risk decks were of larger variances 195 
(occasional but large losses). There was no difference on the expected rewards 196 
between A and B, or between C and D. During each trial, the participants were 197 
instructed to select one in four decks by pressing keyword buttons marked with A, B, 198 
C and D. Each selection was followed by an immediate display of feedback with total 199 
budget. The percentages of different choices on each block were recorded to reflect 200 
participants’ learning process and preference of decision-making. 201 
BART and behavioral measurements 202 
For this study the BART (Figure 1) was based on the original version developed by 203 
Lejuez et al. (2002). Four items were present to participants during testing: a small 204 
balloon, a pump-button, a collection-button and a display to show the number of 205 
pumps made in the current trial and total budget. Within each trial, the participants 206 
were instructed to press keyword buttons alternatively (marked with “pump” and 207 
“collect” accordingly) to pump the balloon, or collect rewards equal to the number of 208 
pumps made in the current trial. 209 
After each pump, the balloon increased its size proportionally in each direction. Each 210 
balloon had a random explosion point obeying a uniform distribution, from 1 to 10. 211 
Thus, the probability that the balloon would explode was fixed at 1/10 for the first 212 
pump. If the balloon did not explode after the first pump, this probability changed into 213 
1/9 on the second pump, and became certainty (i.e. 1/1) after the ninth pump. 214 
According to the algorithm of Lejuez et al. (2002), the average breakpoint of 215 
explosion was 5 pumps. If a balloon was pumped past its explosion point, the display 216 
showed an exploded balloon and the reward of this trial was zero. 217 
The aim of participants in the BART task was to maximize the total rewards by 218 
increasing the pumps before collection while limiting the number of trials ending in 219 
an explosion. They did this through 80 trials (4 blocks, with 20 trials in each block). 220 
The number of adjusted pumps (the average number of pumps on successfully 221 
collected trials) was calculated to reflect participants risk tendency. Additionally, to 222 
explore the effect of historical feedback on participants’ current decision-making, the 223 
adjusted pumps were calculated from two types of trials: the trials following a 224 
successful collection trial or following an explosion trial. 225 
<Figure 1> 226 
Feedback–locked ERPs: FRN and P300 227 
Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded via tin electrodes mounted in an elastic 228 
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cap (NeroScan Inc., USA) from three electrodes: FZ, FCZ and CZ, according to sites 229 
of International 10/20 system. Eye blinks were recorded from right supraorbital and 230 
infraorbital electrodes for artifact reduction. The electrodes at left/right mastoids 231 
served as the reference points and the GND electrode on the cap served as ground. All 232 
EEGs were recorded at the simple rate of 1,000Hz and referenced to the averaged 233 
voltage of mastoids. During recording, the impedance of all electrodes was kept 234 
below 10kΩ. 235 
Recorded EEGs were first amplified with a 0.1-30Hz band pass. Ocular artifacts and 236 
other aberrant signals were deducted through the off-line analysis of Curry 7 237 
(NeroScan Inc., USA) with a ±100μV threshold. The EEG epochs (800ms: from 238 
200ms pre-feedback to 600ms after feedback) were then extracted and averaged to 239 
obtain feedback-locked ERPs. Consistent with previous studies (Wu & Zhou, 2009; 240 
Yeung & Sanfey, 2004), the FRN and P300 were measured by the mean amplitudes 241 
within the fixed time windows. In this study, the FRN amplitudes were averaged from 242 
200-300ms post-onset of feedback, and P300 amplitudes were averaged from 243 
350-450ms periods. 244 
Procedure 245 
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were required to complete the DBQ with 246 
the appended questionnaires to gather their on-road behaviors, demographics and 247 
driving experience. The version of the DBQ for this study was based on the 33-item 248 
version (Lajunen et al., 2004), containing 11 items to measure drivers’ risky driving 249 
(i.e. ordinary and aggressive violations). DBQ-violation was rated by the five-point 250 
Likert scale, from 1- “not conducted this risky behavior at all”, to 5- “always 251 
conducted this risky behavior”. 252 
During the experiment, participants were instructed to gain as great a total reward as 253 
possible during IGT and BART. The experimental tasks were displayed by E-prime 254 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., USA) in a 19inch monitor, 60cm in front of the 255 
participants. Before the formal tasks, participants were allowed to perform a training 256 
sessions to familiarize with the display and control. The training sessions contained 257 
20 trials for IGT and 10 trials for BART, with exactly the same appearance as formal 258 
tasks but faked feedbacks. During formal tasks, the participants’ decisions and ERPs 259 
to feedback were recorded simultaneously. After they had finished all tasks, the 260 
participants were provided with monetary rewards, equal to (total score of IGT + 261 
adjusted pumps of BART)/100 Yuan, as additional payment. 262 
Experiment design and statistical methods 263 
To explore the individual differences on the behavioral and neural patterns between 264 
risky and safe drivers’ decision-making, a mixed design was adopted. The 265 
between-group factor was drivers of high/low on-road risk tendency. At the behavioral 266 
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level, percentages of IGT choices and adjusted pumps of BART were examined, 267 
considering the four blocks as a within-group effect to evaluate the learning effect of 268 
through historic feedback. At the neural level, the amplitudes of FRN and P300 were 269 
analyzed, with electrode position forming a further within-subjects variable (FZ, FCZ 270 
and CZ). The statistical analysis was conducted with repeated-measures ANOVA in R 271 
(version 3.0.3). The significant main effect of independent variable was decomposed 272 
via post-hoc t-test comparisons, adjusted with a Bonferroni correction. 273 
RESULTS 274 
Split of risky and safe drivers 275 
To divide the drivers according to their on-road risk tendency, participants were 276 
classified depending on whether their scores fell above or below the median of 277 
DBQ-violation score (equal to 26.5). The average score for risky drivers was 33.4 278 
(SD= 3.1), and average score for safe drivers was 21.2 (SD= 2.1). Independent t tests 279 
were conducted to examine whether demographics and driving experiences differed 280 
between the two groups (See Table 1). The only significance was reported for the 281 
number of self-reported violations (𝑡 = 1.59, 𝑝 =  .03), which suggested that drivers 282 
in the risky group engaged in more frequent risky driving than drivers with lower 283 
DBQ-violation scores. 284 
<Table 1> 285 
Percentage of the IGT choices 286 
At the behavioral level of IGT, both risky and safe drivers were generally risk-averse 287 
and modulated their decisions according to reward history (see Figure 2). All 288 
participants were able to recognize the difference of expected rewards across different 289 
decks, and accordingly decreased the number of cards taken from disadvantage decks 290 
(A and B) and increased number of cards taken from advantage decks (C and D). The 291 
main effect of block was found for the percentages of A (F(3,66) = 6.61, 𝑝 < .01), B 292 
(F(3,66) = 7.52, 𝑝 < .01), C (F(3,66) = 9.73, 𝑝 < .01) and D (F(3,66) = 2.81, 𝑝 =293 
.04). Despite risky drivers appearing to choose more cards from the risky decks and 294 
less cards from safe decks compared to the safe drivers, the between-group difference 295 
of each single deck was not supported by the statistical analysis (A (F(1,22) = 0.79,296 
𝑝 = .38), B (F(1,22) = 2.74, 𝑝 = .11), C (F(1,22) = 3.18, 𝑝 = .09), D (F(1,22) = 2.12,297 
𝑝 = .15)). As to the percentage of advantage-minus-disadvantage choices, the effect 298 
of block showed significance (F(3,66) = 22.52, 𝑝 < .01), but no notable difference 299 
was established between the two groups. The only significant between-group 300 
difference was the percentage of safe-minus-risky choices  (F(1,22) = 4.83, 𝑝 = .04)  301 
with risky drivers having a lower percentage than safe drivers. Both groups however 302 
increased safe-minus-risky choices in the subsequent block than earlier 303 
block (F(3,66) = 3.09, 𝑝 = .03). 304 
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<Figure 2> 305 
Adjusted pumps of BART 306 
A between-group effect was found with the adjusted pumps measure ( F(1,22) =307 
3.42, 𝑝 = .02) with risky drivers making an average of 4.8 pumps on successful trials, 308 
while safe drivers made only 4.3 pumps on average (see Figure 3). There was no 309 
significant effect of block and group×block interaction. When the BART trials were 310 
divided according to the feedback (collection or explosion) of previous trial, the 311 
adjusted pumps after collection were higher than adjusted pumps after explosion. An 312 
interaction was also noted between driver group and previous feedback: although 313 
there was no between-group difference for the adjusted pumps following a successful 314 
collection trial, the decrease noted for the adjusted pumps after an explosion was 315 
significantly greater for the safe drivers compared to the risky drivers  (F(1,22) =316 
5.61, 𝑝 = .03). No significant effect of block and group×block interaction was 317 
reported on the adjusted pumps after either collection or explosion. 318 
<Figure 3> 319 
FRN and P300  320 
Figure 4 presents the IGT ERPs on negative (loss, solid line) and positive (win, 321 
dashed line) feedbacks at the electrodes of FZ, FCZ and FC for the advantage, 322 
disadvantage, safe and risky choices. The 2 (group: risky and safe drivers)  ×8 323 
(feedback: advantage decks-loss/win, disadvantage decks-loss/win, risky 324 
decks-loss/win, safe decks-loss/win)  × 3 (electrode: FZ, FCZ and FC) 325 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. The amplitudes of FRN significantly 326 
differed between the groups ( F(1,504) = 5.69, 𝑝 < .01) and the group×feedback 327 
interaction was also significant ( F(7,504) = 4.42, 𝑝 < .01). The FRN amplitudes of 328 
risky drivers were significantly lower (𝑝 < .05) than that of safe drivers for all 329 
negative feedbacks (advantage loss, disadvantage loss, safe loss and risky loss). No 330 
significant between-group difference of FRN amplitudes was reported for the positive 331 
feedbacks. The P300 amplitudes were significantly affected by the group ( F(1,504) =332 
2.51, 𝑝 = .01), feedback ( F(7,504) = 4.11, 𝑝 < .01) and their interaction ( F(7,504) =333 
2.42, 𝑝 = .02). The P300 amplitudes of risky drivers were significantly higher than 334 
that of safe drivers in disadvantage-win ( 𝑝 = .02 ) and risky-win ( 𝑝 < .01 ). 335 
Meanwhile, the P300 amplitudes for positive feedbacks were significantly higher 336 
(𝑝 < .01) than that for the corresponding negative feedbacks for both groups. 337 
Additionally, FRNs and P300 did not significantly differ across electrodes of FZ, FCZ 338 
and CZ during IGT. 339 
<Figure 4> 340 
Figure 5 shows the BART ERPs on negative (explosion, in solid line) and positive 341 
(collection, in dashed line) feedbacks at the electrodes of FZ, FCZ and CZ. The 2 342 
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(group: risky and safe drivers) × 2 (feedback: collection and explosion)  × 3 343 
(electrode: FZ, FCZ and FC) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. The FRN 344 
amplitudes were significantly affected by group (  F(1,126) = 11.54, 𝑝 < .01 ), 345 
feedback (  F(1.126) = 65.22, 𝑝 < .01 ) and produced a significant interaction 346 
( F(1,126) = 4.67, 𝑝 = .03). The FRN amplitudes of risky drivers were significantly 347 
lower (𝑝 < .01) than that of safe drivers for negative feedbacks. No significant 348 
between-group difference of FRN amplitudes (𝑝 = .19) was reported for positive 349 
feedbacks. The significantly higher (𝑝 < .01) FRN amplitudes occurred at the 350 
negative feedbacks rather than the positive feedbacks for both groups. The P300 351 
amplitudes were significantly affected by feedback ( F(1,126) = 4.11, 𝑝 < .01) and 352 
group×feedback interaction (  F(1,126) = 6.34, 𝑝 < .01). The P300 amplitudes of 353 
negative feedbacks were significantly higher (𝑝 < .01) than that of positive feedbacks, 354 
and this difference was smaller for risky drivers than safe drivers. No significant main 355 
and interaction effects of electrodes were reported on either FRN or P300 during 356 
BART. 357 
<Figure 5> 358 
Differences of neural responses between negative and positive feedbacks 359 
The results of the behavioral measures have demonstrated that self-reported 360 
risk-taking during driving relates to performance on two decontextualized measures of 361 
risk taking. Risky drivers showed higher probabilities for choosing from risky decks 362 
in the IGT (significant for the percentage of safe-risky choices), and made more 363 
pumps on average on successful BART trials. One possible interpretation of these 364 
findings is that the high-risk individuals might differ from the low-risk individuals on 365 
the responses to losses versus gains (Crowley et al., 2009; Fein & Chang, 2008). To 366 
assess this assumption, the loss-minus-gain amplitudes of FRN and P300, which were 367 
calculated by ERPs of negative feedbacks minus that of positive feedbacks, were 368 
compared between two groups across varied decision types respectively (detailed in 369 
Figure 6). Since no significant effects of the electrodes were reported, the ERPs used 370 
here were averaged from FZ, FCZ and CZ. 371 
For all decisions in IGT and BART, the amplitudes of FRN evoked by negative 372 
feedbacks were larger on average (more negative-going) than those evoked by 373 
positive feedbacks. Moreover, the loss-minus-gain FRN amplitudes were smaller for 374 
risky drivers than those of the safe drivers, which demonstrated the significances in 375 
IGT-advantage (𝑝 < .01), IGT-disadvantage (𝑝 = .03), IGT-risky (𝑝 < .01) and 376 
BART (𝑝 < .01). 377 
However, in regard to P300 amplitudes, negative feedback evoked smaller 378 
positive-going voltage than the positive feedbacks in IGT, and evoked larger 379 
positive-going voltage in BART. Additionally, the differences of loss-minus-gain 380 
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P300 amplitudes between two groups were also modified by the specific paradigms 381 
and according decision types. The loss-minus-gain P300 amplitudes of the risky 382 
drivers, as compared to the safe drivers, were significantly larger in IGT-advantage 383 
(𝑝 = .04) and IGT-risky (𝑝 = .05), and were significantly smaller in BART (𝑝 < .01). 384 
DISCUSSION 385 
The aim of this study was to examine the individual difference of decision-making 386 
between risky and safe drivers in terms of behavioral and neural responses. Two 387 
psychological paradigms, IGT and BART, were adopted for this purpose. The results 388 
failed to reject the hypotheses that the laboratory measurements of behavioral and 389 
feedback-related ERP responses across varied decontextualized decision types were 390 
associated with drivers’ DBQ-violation scores and corresponding self-reported 391 
on-road risky behaviors. 392 
At the behavioral level, the risky drivers, whose DBQ-violation scores were above the 393 
median score, showed lower percentage of safe-risky choices in IGT, and also 394 
demonstrated more pumps during BART. During IGT, although both risky and safe 395 
drivers had the similar capacities to identify the decks with higher expected rewards 396 
(advantage choices: C and D) through a long-term learning of selections and 397 
feedbacks (A. Bechara et al., 1997), the risky drivers demonstrated greater preference 398 
for the risky decks than safe drivers. Compared with safe decks (A and C), risky decks 399 
produced identical expected rewards but higher reward variances, which suggests 400 
drivers with a high on-road risk tendency are more likely to tolerate the options of 401 
uncertainty. During BART, the adjusted pumps (i.e. average number of pumps in trials 402 
ending with collection) were significantly higher for the risky drivers than that for 403 
safe drivers, which implies that the impulsivity and sensation-seeking assessed in 404 
BART may reflect similar characteristics on the road  (Lauriola et al., 2014; Lejuez 405 
et al., 2002). When the trials were divided by the outcomes of previous trials (either 406 
an explosion or a successful collection), the results suggested the between-group 407 
difference on total adjusted pumps was mainly due to the higher adjusted pumps after 408 
explosion for the risky drivers. The risky drivers were less likely to revise the current 409 
risky decision-making (balloon pumps) according to the historic negative feedback 410 
(explosions) than the safe drivers. 411 
At the neural level, the feedback-locked ERPs, in terms of FRN and P300 amplitudes, 412 
were qualified by the between-group effect, correlating with the feedback types of 413 
specific paradigms. Consistent with previous studies (Bellebaum et al., 2010; Crowley 414 
et al., 2009; Frank et al., 2005; Lange et al., 2012), the FRNs were present in 415 
approximately 300ms after the feedbacks, and visually more negative-going for 416 
negative than positive feedbacks in either IGT or BART. More importantly, the 417 
universal between-group difference of FRNs was demonstrated for both paradigms, 418 
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which suggested that the amplitudes of negative-feedback-related FRN for risky 419 
drivers were significantly lower than those of safe drivers. As for the P300, the 420 
amplitudes of positive and negative feedbacks were differentiated by the specific 421 
paradigms. For both groups of drivers, the P300 amplitudes relating to positive 422 
feedback were significantly higher than those relating to negative feedback in the IGT, 423 
and were significantly lower in the BART. The between-group difference of P300 also 424 
differed between two paradigms. In comparison with safe drivers, the risky drivers 425 
demonstrated higher amplitudes of P300 to positive feedback in the IGT with 426 
significance effects noted for the disadvantage and risky decks, though no differences 427 
were noted in the BART. 428 
As demonstrated by the behavioral measures, the risky and safe drivers showed 429 
different patterns of decision-making in two long-term selection paradigms. One 430 
intuitional explanation for these findings was the individual differences of cognitive 431 
response to the negative-versus-positive feedbacks (Crowley et al., 2009; San Martin 432 
et al., 2013). On this basis, the between-group comparisons on the loss-minus-gain 433 
amplitudes of FRN and P300 provide an alternative perspective. The risky driver 434 
showed smaller (negative-going) loss-minus-gain FRN amplitudes with significances 435 
in all feedbacks expect for the IGT-safe decks, which suggested that they were 436 
generally less sensitive during the error-detection process than the safe drivers 437 
(Bellebaum et al., 2010; Frank et al., 2005; van Veen & Carter, 2002). In terms of 438 
P300 amplitudes, the IGT paradigm evoked more pronounced component at gains. 439 
However, BART paradigm evoked more pronounced component at losses. The 440 
between-group difference of loss-minus-gain P300 amplitudes was varied across 441 
paradigms and decision types. The risky drivers demonstrated significantly larger 442 
(more negative-going) loss-minus-gain P300 amplitudes at IGT-advantage and 443 
IGT-risky decks and smaller (less positive-going) loss-minus-gain P300 amplitudes 444 
with the BART. Given that the P300 could indicate the motivational significance of 445 
engagement during reward-evaluation (Carlson et al., 2009; Lange et al., 2012; San 446 
Martin et al., 2013; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004), it is reasonable to suggest that the risky 447 
drivers engaged more attention resources in the win conditions of IGT-advantage and 448 
IGT-risky decks than the safe drivers, and were correspondingly less engaged in the 449 
loss conditions of the BART. Combing these findings with the behavioral patterns 450 
mentioned above, the risky drivers’ decision-making was relatively insensitive to the 451 
losses, and highly motivated by the rewards. 452 
Limitations 453 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the individual 454 
differences on the behaviors and underlie neural processes of decision-making among 455 
drivers differentiated by on-road risk tendency. To exclude other possible individual 456 
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factors, our samples were selected from the young male drivers of university 457 
population. Since previous studies had reported that several individual contributors, 458 
such as gender and age, were significant to the decision-making (Crowley et al., 2009; 459 
Lauriola et al., 2014) and driving behaviors (Ivers et al., 2009; Iversen & Rundmo, 460 
2002; Turner & McClure, 2003; Ulleberg & Rundmo, 2003), the larger and more 461 
representative simples could be necessary for generalizing these findings to the 462 
universal populations. The main effects of feedbacks on neural responses were 463 
reported in this study. Since several studies have detailed the neural variances to 464 
feedback with varied valence, magnitude and expectancy (Carlson et al., 2009; Wu & 465 
Zhou, 2009; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004), more sophisticated discussions on this issue are 466 
beyond the primary scope of this study. However, it should be noted that the 467 
individual differences on ERPs, especially for the P300 components, were largely 468 
determined by the specific decision paradigms. 469 
CONCLUSION 470 
The findings of this study demonstrated that drivers with high/low on-road risk 471 
tendency differed in their patterns of decision-making, as indicated by both behavioral 472 
and neural measures. Although both risky and safe drivers could recognize the 473 
high-rewards options during the long-term selection-feedback process, the risky 474 
drivers showed more preferences to the choices with larger variances (detailed in the 475 
percentage of IGT choices). In addition, the risky drivers also took risks more 476 
frequently for the higher rewards and appeared less influenced by previous negative 477 
feedback (detailed in the adjusted BART pumps). Underlining the cognitive process, 478 
the risky drivers showed lower evoked neural responses to the negative feedbacks 479 
(smaller loss-minus-gain FRN amplitudes in both IGT and BART, smaller 480 
loss-minus-gain P300 amplitudes in BART) and were more highly motived by the 481 
positive feedbacks (larger loss-minus-gain P300 amplitudes in IGT). 482 
These findings have several important implications to explain the cognitive 483 
mechanism of on-road risky behaviors. First, the drivers’ on-road risk-taking as 484 
measured by self-reported DBQ-violations appears linked to neural and behavioral 485 
patterns in context-free environments. Secondly, the risky drivers were relatively less 486 
concerned with errors and were more reward-motivated than safe drivers during 487 
decision-making, which was associated with their according neural processing of 488 
error-detection and reward-evaluation. During daily driving, drivers make various 489 
decisions to optimize the balance of efficiency and safety, qualified by the individuals’ 490 
subjective appraisals. Thus, for more effective countermeasures to reduce risky 491 
driving, one useful approach might be to identify divers’ risk tendency at the stage of 492 
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List of Tables 595 
Table 1 Distribution of demographics and driving experience of risky and safe drivers 596 
Variables Risky drivers (n=12) Safe drivers (n=12) t p 
Age 24.5 (2.2)  23.6 (1.1) 1.32 0.21 
Education a  2.2 (0.8)   1.8 (0.9) 1.19 0.25 
Driving frequency(times per week)   2 (1.0)   2.5 (0.9) 1.25 0.22 
Years of driving  4.9 (1.1)   4.9 (0.8) 0.01 1.00 
Annual distance of driving (km)  4792.0 (2189.4)   4958.1 (1912.4) 0.20 0.84 
Violations(times in recent three years)  3.1 (3.0)   0.8 (1.3) 2.32 0.03 
Accidents (times in recent three years)  0.4 (0.5)   0.3 (0.6) 1.59 0.12 
a Education: 1-high school, 2-bachelor, 3-master, 4-docator 597 




List of Figures 600 
 601 
Figure 1 Trial sequence of IGT and BART. The feedbacks for both paradigms were presented 602 
at 600ms after participants’ selections, and lasted for 2000ms 603 
 604 
 605 





Figure 3 Adjusted pumps of BART across blocks. Error bars depicted standard deviations 609 
 610 
 611 









Figure 6 FRN and P300 loss-minus-gain amplitudes for risky and safe drivers. Error bars 619 
depicted standard deviations. Negative-going loss-minus-gain FRN indicated that the 620 
negative feedbacks evoked more pronounced error signals than positive feedbacks. 621 
Positive-going loss-minus-gain P300 indicated that the negative feedbacks evoked higher 622 
motivational attentions than positive feedbacks. Negative-going loss-minus-gain P300 623 
indicated that the positive feedbacks evoked higher motivational attentions than negative 624 
feedbacks. Significances of between-group comparisons:  ∗ 𝑝 < .05, ∗∗ 𝑝 < .01 625 
